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The Politicization of Religion by the CCP:
A Selective Retrieval
Abstract: This essays looks at the diversity of approaches used by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) in its politicization of religions. It first provides an
overview of continuity with past practices by the Chinese state in the imperial
and republican eras to stress the undetermined nature of ideological change in
China. Then, it looks at the mechanisms by which the CCP makes religion a
political issue and a matter of public concern within broader agendas. It stresses
that this politicization of religions has unfolded in two different ways since 1949:
besides the negative and coercive approach of the authorities, positive and coop-
erative strategy are also implemented. The regime hopes religions will be active
politically to promote its objectives, such as projecting abroad an image of China’s
soft power, raising funds for philanthropic activities within China, or supporting the
state ‘patriotic’ agenda. The actions by the CCP suggest that it does not look at all
religions as equally valuable to serve its political objectives, as it still maintains a
distinction between official and banned religions. The article documents that the
state’s encouragement to the revival of some religious activities is selective but on
the other hand that CCP views are more nuanced than outsiders assume.
Keywords: state administration of religious affairs in China, Chinese Communist
Party religious work
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1 Introduction
This essay looks at the politicization of religion by the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). This is part of a broader agenda of using tradition as a source of
legitimation for the CCP authority, an issue that is receiving increasing amount
of attention in recent research.1 In this essay, “politicization” means the attempt
by the CCP to make religion a political issue, or an issue of public concern. This
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has unfolded in two different ways since 1949. Politicization can be negative, or
coercive, for example when the CCP during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)
targeted all religions as “reactionary” accomplices to their political enemies, and
more recently, in 1999, when Jiang Zemin selectively targeted Falungong, which
he saw as a political threat. In the first years of the PRC and since the beginning
of the reform and opening, however, the CCP has embraced a positive, or
cooperative, politicization of religion, implemented by the cooptation of elites
to establish religious associations for each official religion. The regime hopes
religion will be active politically to promote its objectives, to project abroad an
image of China’s soft power, to raise funds for philanthropic activities within
China, or to support its “patriotic” (aiguozhuyi 爱国主义) agenda.2 Keeping in
mind the near destruction of most forms of religion during the period of the
Cultural Revolution, the more recent call by the state to encourage the recovery
and bringing back to life of some religions represents a retrieval of religion.
Obviously, this recovery could hardly lead to a return to the status quo ante
because of the extent of changes experienced by China and the world since Mao.
But this retrieval is also selective because political mobilization by religious
leaders must serve the regime, and as we will see below, the actions by the state
suggest that it does not look at all religions as equally valuable to serve its
political objectives. The state still maintains a distinction between official and
banned religions, the latter dismissed as “superstitions”, or as “evil cults”.3
With the commitment to socialist ideology weakened by the actions it has
adopted since the beginning of the reform and opening policy in 1978, the CCP
experiences an ongoing crisis of legitimacy. It seeks to address that problem,
among other strategies, by affirming its role as the custodian and protector of
Chinese traditions.4 This positive politicization of traditions, which represents a
complete reversal of the iconoclastic approach embraced during the Cultural
Revolution, includes a variety of actions such as the restoration of sites such as
monuments, memorials, historical sites, and religious venues, with the help of
state funding, and often in conjunction with support from private foundations.5
The focus of this essay is on the politicization of religious traditions, which
extends to efforts at promoting intangible heritage. This became a major under-
taking, for example, with the promotion by provincial governments of the cult to
the Yellow Emperor during Jiang Zemin’s tenure as China’s leader,6 and
2 For an example of the latter, see Vala 2012.
3 See Yang 2008 for the distinction between official religions and superstitions.
4 See Brady 2012. For an account of earlier efforts after 1989, see Zhao 1998.
5 See Oakes/Sutton eds. 2010.
6 See Billeter 2007.
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continued during Hu Jintao’s leadership when the CCP sponsored, with the help
of united front organizations, international conferences promoting Chinese
Buddhism and Taoism.7 The Xi Jinping administration so far maintains this
approach, as official support in 2014 for international conferences about
Taoism and Buddhism on Chinese soil suggests. I focus in this essay on the
religious dimension of this politicization of tradition and argue that the politi-
cization of religion as a positive force in Chinese society does not herald a move
towards the adoption of a liberal policy on religious practice: there is resistance
to the latter among many cadres in the party, because many still harbor fears
about religion as a possible threat to the regime.
Officially, the views on religion propagated by the CCP have changed
since the Cultural Revolution from a wholesale attack on religious institutions
and all kinds of religious beliefs and rituals – dismissed as feudal superstition
(fengjian mixin 封建迷信) – to the current celebration of religions as part of
Chinese cultural tradition.8 This essay agrees with most of the recent conclu-
sions reached in research about the legislation of religion in China that we
cannot interpret existing regulations and laws as the implementation of the
state’s liberal neutrality towards all religions, but rather, as a deepening of
government control.9 The simultaneous celebration of religious diversity by
the CCP and the ongoing surveillance of religion by its controlling apparatus
begs the question: what sense can we make of these contradictory actions? In
this essay I argue that contrary to what a commitment to Marxism-Leninism
would lead one to expect, the CCP’s guidance on religious affairs relies on an
understanding of China’s religious complexity. This implies that far from
basing its policies on the idea of the withering away of religion, it looks at
religion as long-lasting and therefore it is mindful of its potential as a resource
or a threat.10 To buttress this argument, the essay first outlines the CCP policy
disparities on religion. Then, it will review the evolution of the CCP policies on
religious affairs to underline how the idea of religion’s complexity has con-
tributed to shape policies.
7 See Dotson 2011.
8 In a large-scale representative survey undertaken in China under the direction of Zhai Jiexia,
over half of the respondents consider that Christianity is a Chinese religion. See Zhai 2010: 104.
9 For recent articles on CCP religious policy reaching a similar conclusion, see Qu 2011; Tong
2010; Lai 2006; Carlson 2005; Leung 2005; Ying 2005; Potter 2003.
10 The cooperative/coercive binary I use to describe the relations between the CCP and
religions must be understood as extremes in a continuum, with the middle ground being
negotiation.
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2 A diversity of policies
The politicization of religion by the CCP takes many forms. On the one hand,
there is a mobilization of religious associations to serve many of the regime’s
objectives, most visibly in the area of social service provision and philan-
thropy,11 but also in the development of tourism,12 the promotion of China’s
soft power abroad,13 and the campaign to promote public morality.14 This
relatively positive appreciation of religion by the state must be seen as part
and parcel of a broader campaign that links together the fate and renewal of
Chinese tradition to the legitimacy of the CCP leadership.15 On the other hand,
the politicization of religion in contemporary China by the regime also betrays
its concerns about the subversive potential of religion in the political sphere. For
example, the state cracks down against specific forms of religious activities that
it considers illegal, such as “evil cults” (xiejiao 邪教) accused of “harming
society”,16 and against unregistered churches. Even for religions that are recog-
nized by the state such as Protestant Christianity and Catholicism, authorities
monitor their activities very tightly and prohibit worship outside of religious
venues. Finally, for government authorities in the autonomous regions popu-
lated by Muslim Uyghur and Tibetan Buddhists, religious affairs are “securi-
tized” in campaigns against “extremism”, “separatism”, and “terrorism”.
The politicization of religion results from the CCP policies on “religious
work” (zongjiao gongzuo 宗教工作). These policies ensure that religious institu-
tions and believers comply with its directives and help it achieve its goals of
social stability maintenance, social services delivery, local economic develop-
ment, etc. This work also includes the most specific goal of monitoring the
11 For an example of official support for that policy, see the statement by the vice-chair of the
United Front Work Department (UFWD) for the Shenzhen City Party Committee, in Yao s.a.
12 See the endorsement of that position from the chair of the UFWD for the Wuxi City Party
Committee, in Zhou 2010: 4.
13 On this topic see Xu/Zou 2014: 7–25.
14 Zhongyang tongzhanbu wangzhang 中央统战部网章, 2002.
15 This was made quite clear by many signposts displayed throughout Beijing in the summer of
2014, with slogans such as “Nurture and promote core socialist values on the basis of traditional
Chinese culture” (立足中华优秀传统文化，培育和弘扬社会主义核心价值观 Lizu Zhonghua
youxiu chuantong wenhua, peiyu he hongyang shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan) ostensibly making
the connection between the CCP’s values and traditional culture.
16 Authorities have spent considerable energies establishing the China Anti-Cult Association, a
research organization with its own website and branches all over the country, which convenes
conferences whose sole purpose is to criticize the target of its activities. See CACA, 2014. For a
critique of this approach, see Zhu 2010.
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development of religious associations and offering guidance to religious leaders
about what they need to do to meet government’s objectives. This politicization
of religion obviously entails a cooperative dimension, when the state mobilizes
religious actors to support its objective, but it can also include a coercive
dimension, when the state believes that religious actors oppose its directives.17
This dual aspect of the politicization affects all forms of religion in China, not
only the five officially recognized religions, albeit unequally and in different
ways.18 Some forms of religion benefit from a more cooperative relation with the
CCP, if not open sponsorship, while other are subjected to a treatment where the
coercive dimension is more important.
The most important targets of the CCP for a cooperative politicization of
religion are Buddhist and Taoist institutions, whose supervision falls under the
same division (si司) within the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA),
a department within the State Council that maintains close relations with the
CCP United Front Work Department. The division for Buddhism and Taoism
administers the Buddhist and Taoist national associations, produces research
guiding policies relevant to Buddhists and Taoists, and advises provincial and
local level Buddhist and Taoist associations to ensure they comply with regula-
tions.19 Because many consider both religions as indigenous to China, this fits
with recent CCP policies that ostensibly promote China’s cultural heritage, as we
will see below. 20 The CCP has shown its support to Buddhism by helping in the
convening of three world Buddhist forums in 2006, 2009, and 2012, even though
the official sponsors were the state-approved Buddhist Association of China
17 The Falungong stands out as a case in point: in 1992, leaders of the Public Security Bureau
believed that the exercises it promoted were beneficial for their health, as noted by Palmer
2005: 341. Jiang Zemin instead saw in the public performance of exercises by Falungong
adherents a critique of his regime. On this point, see Thornton 2002.
18 A rough indicator of the differential treatment faced by religions is the large number of
Christian sects deemed “cults” by the China Anti-Cult Association (CACA), relative to the much
smaller number of Buddhist associations that face a similar fate. Over the 20 sects the CACA
considered “cults” nationwide, only two were Buddhists, and at least twelve were Christians.
See Duihua 2014.
19 Although the director of the SARA’s ranking is not at a ministerial-level, his powers are
much more important than those of his Taiwanese counterpart, who leads a small office within
the MOI’s Department of Civil Affairs. On the latter, see Laliberté 2009.
20 Yang (2011) and official statistics from the Chinese government claim that there are more
Christians than there are Taoists, on the basis of a strict definition of Taoist, which excludes
adherents of communal cults and popular beliefs. The argument that Buddhism and Taoism are
“authentic” Chinese religions is not supported by everyone in China: I have met over the years
enthusiastic followers of national studies (guoxue国学) who claim that only Taoism qualifies as
an indigenous Chinese religion.
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(BAC), its Hong Kong counterpart, and the Buddha Light International
Association (BLIA), an organization from Taiwan.21 At the local level, the CCP
cooperative dimension of its politicization of Buddhism for the last two decades
meant support for the reopening of temples expropriated during the Cultural
Revolution, and the reconstruction of others destroyed during that period or
before.22 This cooperative politicization of Buddhism, most importantly, meant
encouraging Buddhist associations to raise money and undertake charitable
activities serving the public interest.23
This CCP positive politicization, or cooptation, of Chinese Buddhism (han-
chuan fojiao 汉传佛教), contrasts with a coercive politicization of Tibetan
(zangchuan 藏传) Buddhism, which is nevertheless also supervised by the
same BAC. The opposition to the Dalai Lama is an obvious example known
worldwide of the coercive dimension of politicization of religion, which entails
the CCP prerogative of approving the reincarnation of the Buddha who should
lead Tibetan Buddhism, as well as the reincarnation for religious leaders at
lower levels.24 The coercive politicization is not limited to Tibetan Buddhism. It
also affects the Mahayana tradition, which counts more adherents than Tibetan
Buddhism.25 For example, during the spring of 2014, the CCP has instructed the
BAC to silence a well-known monk, Shi Shengguan (释声关), who had opposed
some of its policies, in particular over the June 4th massacre.26 Overall, however,
the CCP politicization of Buddhism tends to be cooperative, and meets a positive
response from most Buddhist institutions and their leaders.27 People like Shi
Shengguan are exceptional in their open opposition to the regime, but the fact
that some have supported him in the past suggests that the cooperative
21 Shi Hsing Yun 释星云 chose exile to Taiwan after 1949 and founded the Foguangshan 佛光
山 monastic order there. He has established the BLIA headquarters in California but he cannot
claim to represent all of Taiwanese Buddhists, many of whom follow other spiritual masters.
22 See Laliberté 2012; Fisher 2011; Ji 2011; Yang/Wei 2005; and Yoshiko 2009.
23 The CCP expects all religions to perform philanthropic activities, but until recently Buddhists
were lagging behind Protestant Christians, who have developed the Amity Foundation, the
largest religious philanthropy in China. For discussions on Buddhist philanthropy, see Wang
2014; Wang/Liu 2011; Liu 2006. For an example of this endorsement from the CCP, see Yao 2010.
For the Amity Foundation, see Wickeri 2011.
24 Arpi 2013.
25 Although all Tibetans are “counted” as Buddhists in official statistics, “only” 18% of China’s
population is considered Buddhist, according to the Pew Research Center – using sources from
the Chinese government. Accounting for the number of ethnic Tibetans, this still leaves a far
greater number of Han Chinese who are Buddhists than there are ethnic Tibetans.
26 Wu 2014.
27 I do not assume that lay Buddhists always support the monks’ generally deferential attitude
towards the CCP.
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politicization of Buddhism through measures such as the rebuilding of temples
and the support to their charity does not always yield the outcome of unques-
tioning obedience to the regime desired by the CCP.
The CCP has also encouraged the growth and renewal of Taoism, for example
by supporting the organization of a major Taoist international conference in 2011.28
The visibility of that support is less apparent than the mobilization of Buddhist
associations orchestrated by the CCP, but this may result from the fact that there
are fewer adherents of Taoism than there are of Buddhism.29 On the other hand,
Taoism is a religion without major doctrinal differences cross-cutting ethnic clea-
vages, the way the differences between the Mahayana, Tibetan, and Theravada
traditions almost reproduce the ethnic cleavages between Han Chinese, Mongols,
Tibetans, and other ethnic minorities.30 Some Taoists are non-Han Chinese, but
their number is small, and they are not found among the minorities that have
grievance over their culture, such as the Tibetans, the Uyghurs, and the Mongols.
Taoists also do not suffer from controversies over religious authority that put them
at odds with the CCP the way Buddhism and Catholicism do, with religious leaders
residing abroad claiming authority over their followers in China.
The CCP also politicizes the three other official religions, but this time the
emphasis on the coercive dimension is more important than is the case with
Buddhism and Taoism. The CCP ostensibly claims to prefer a cooperative
approach to Christianity and Islam, but the coercive dimension of its politiciza-
tion, enforced in particular by the police and security apparatus, is likely to be
felt more strongly for people who profess minority religions, all the more so
because they live in a society where the state professes the superiority of its
atheist orientation. The rationale for the coercive dimension differs whether it is
directed at Christians, both Protestant or Catholics, or Muslims: the CCP
expresses concern over what it sees as the attempts by Christian missionaries
to destabilize society via evangelism, and fears the spread of violence by
extremists and terrorists among the latter. The rhetorical construction of
Christian and Muslim “threats” includes appeal to nationalism that denounce
the connection between Christians and “foreign infiltration on campus”,31 on the
one hand, and denunciation of Muslim as “terrorists”,32 on the other.
28 Ye 2011
29 It is difficult to avoid conflating Taoism with folk traditions such as the Mazu pilgrimage.
This makes the counting of Taoist adherents difficult, and this also complicates any effort to
impose any form of orthodoxy.
30 There are some cross-cutting cleavages, with many Han Chinese embracing Tibetan
Buddhism.
31 Xuyang 2013; General Office of the CCCCP and General Office of the PRC State Council, 2011.
32 For an example of that approach, see Liu 2014.
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Examples of the coercive dimension in the politicization of religion in
relation to Christianity abounds: the most recent ones in 2014 were the cam-
paign against churches in Zhejiang because crosses atop them were deemed too
big, and the continuing crackdown in Beijing against the Shouwang Church,
whose leaders have been under house arrest since 2011.33 There is a widespread
perception among officials, which was conveyed to me over the years in many
interviews, that the state is “worried” by the growth of Christian churches. For
different reasons, the CCP policies towards Muslims under Xi Jinping have taken
a turn towards more intransigence, for example with directives preventing the
observance of the Ramadan, under the pretext of fighting against “extremism”.34
This time the fear is not so much a growth of conversions to Islam, but the
possibility of separatism among Uyghurs.35 These tensions should not leave us
with the impression that the CCP has adopted a one-sided and coercive politi-
cization of Christianity and Islam. Cooperation between the government and
Christians – Protestants and Catholics alike – exists, and despite the occurrences
mentioned before, many Christians worship without too much state interference
in local churches, including the Protestant “house churches” and the Catholic
churches “loyal” to Rome.36 The engagement in charity has also contributed in
no small part to good relations between the regime and Muslim organizations.37
The politicization of religion in China, whether cooperative or coercive, does
not stop with the CCP united front work in relation to the five recognized
religions or the more tense relations with the non-recognized “cults”. It also
affects religions recognized as “world religions”, by the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences’ Institute of World Religions, such as Judaism, Mormonism, the
Eastern Orthodox Church, and Baha’ism. In some cases, local governments have
ensured places of worship in large cities where foreign adherents of these
religions are likely to worship.38 The cooperative politicization of religion also
benefits other forms of religious practices and worship that have not received
official recognition and that are not institutionalized, known as “popular
beliefs” (minjian xinyang 民间信仰), but which are increasingly receiving some
33 Harvey et al. 2014.
34 Farooq 2014.
35 This is not an issue for the other Muslim minorities, some of whom are dispersed throughout
China, such as the Hui, or are too few in numbers, such as the Kazakhs.
36 For a history of the relations between Protestant Christians and the regime, see Wickeri 2011.
For an account of the Catholics’ relations with the CCP, see Zhou/Li 2005.
37 See McCarthy 2013.
38 On the restoration of synagogues for worship, see Xin 2003. For the Latter-Day Saints
Church, also known as Mormons, see Vendassi/Thornely 2014.
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forms of consideration from the authorities as “intangible (feiyi 非遗) heritage”.39
The CCP adopts the same attitude with respect to other religions that have many
followers in Taiwan and in the global Chinese diaspora. Hence, although the state
does not recognize Yiguandao (一贯道), a religion hugely popular in Taiwan, its
followers can find accommodation to their worship in some temples registered as
Buddhist or Taoist.40
The lack of regal recognition for Yiguandao naturally brings back to mind
the issue of institutionalized religions that are not legalized, many of which the
regime denounces as “evil cults”. In the case of movements such as Falungong
and the Church of Almighty God, the state has clearly politicized them nega-
tively, as a “cult” that seeks to undermine the regime, in the case of the former,
or as part of a sinister plot abetted by foreign hostile forces, in the case of the
latter.41 There are other groups among the un-recognized religious institutions
existing in China, however, which the state tolerates. Besides the unrecognized
branches of existing religions and unrecognized world religions mentioned
before, a variety of religious phenomena exist that do not fit with the categories
mentioned so far, some of which have emerged before the founding of the PRC,
such as the religions of the ethnic minorities, and the teachings of “spiritual
masters” and “religious entrepreneurs”.42 One example of the latter is Li Juming
李居明, a lay Buddhist based in Hong Kong, who claims expertise in divination
and other Taoist techniques. Not part of any official association, he remains
nonetheless accepted in the Chinese religious landscape, even if he has pro-
moted practices that until recently were criticized as superstitious (mixin迷信).43
We cannot take for granted this tolerance, however, as the case of Shi Jingkong
释凈空 illustrates. A Buddhist monk born in China but living abroad, he stands
accused of heading a cult and faces a ban on his entry.44
The status of Confucianism as a religion represents another instance
wherein the cooperative politicization of religion is possible, but difficult to
39 Liu 2014: 101–105.
40 Billioud 2011.
41 On the change of approach adopted by the CCP towards Falungong before and after the
decision in 1999 to crack down on the group, see Ownby 2008; Tong 2010; Palmer 2005. On the
different churches that claim an affiliation to Christianity but not recognized as such, see Dunn
2010.
42 On the different taxonomies of unregistered religions, see Walton 2014; Tong 2010; Palmer
2010.
43 I could not find a scholarly treatment of Li Juming (also known as Edward Li Kui-ming), but
his work is widely available and shops under his name are open near Yonghegong雍和宫 Lama
temple in Beijing.
44 Duihua 2014.
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implement. The idea that Confucianism should constitute a national religion is the
desire of a vocal minority of cultural nationalists,45 and although the promotion
by the state of the Confucian Institutes may appear to support such an agenda, it
is misleading: the Hanban office that manages the Institute has no reference to
Confucius. The agency has chosen for its name the sage of Qufu, because he is
one of the better-known Chinese among foreigners who is not controversial.
Confucianism, however, is likely to remain officially promoted as an ethical
system and an example of China’s traditional culture and intangible heritage.46
State officials and CCP cadres are more likely to feel comfortable promoting
Confucianism if they think it is an ethical system than a religious belief. If they
had chosen to turn Confucianism into a religion, the contradiction between their
professed atheism and the promotion of religion, already compromised with the
promotion of Buddhism and Taoism, would be even more acute. The ongoing
debates on the religious nature of Confucianism remain intertwined with the
revival of popular beliefs and some of the unrecognized religious institutions.47
Speculations on China’s “sixth religion” are unlikely to bear fruit, however, as
“popular beliefs” are not likely to be officially recognized soon.48
We need to keep four caveats in mind when looking at the politicization of
religion by the CCP. First, it should not be exaggerated: it also builds on an
attitude of indifference towards religion by the majority of the population in
Chinese society, if we are to believe what citizens of that country tell social
scientists who survey them on their religious beliefs.49 The regime remains
committed to its goal of promoting atheist education and on the surface it appears
to have succeeded at instilling this world-view to the population. Religion is far
less visible in the Chinese media than in their Taiwanese counterparts.50
Secondly, not all of the five religions are equal in the eyes of government
officials.51 As we have seen above, some party cadres worry about the growth
45 Kang Xiaoguang and Jiang Qing are the two best-known examples of this trend.
46 On the controversy about Confucianism as a religion, see Sun 2013: ch. 3: 77–95.
47 See Billioud 2010: 203, 214, who writes about them as “folk religions” and “salvationist
religions”, respectively.
48 As Adam Chau has demonstrated in his ethnography of a temple to the Black Dragon King
temple in Northwest China, temples identified to such “popular beliefs” could be registered as
Taoist (Chau 2005b).
49 The Pew Research Center counts 52% of the Chinese population as religiously unaffiliated,
and finds China the country with the largest number of religious affiliated, although 7% of that
group also believe in God. See Pew Research Center 2012. See also Yang/Hu 2012.
50 Social media are contributing to shatter that impression. See Travagnin forthcoming.
51 These religions are: Buddhism, Taoism, Protestant Christianity, (also now as “New
Religion”), Catholicism, and Islam. This policy is a legacy of the previous KMT regime. See
Yang 2008.
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and development of Christianity in the area they rule, and would prefer the
growth of Buddhism to pre-empt the former’s.52
Thirdly, the state’s positive acceptance of some forms of religions is condi-
tional on meeting a host of regulatory requirements that are not clearly defined
and vary across the country. In other words, even religious associations that
belong to one of the five religions recognized by the state may face different
treatment from one province to another, depending on the local laws on reli-
gious affairs.53 For example, as we have seen above, Protestant churches in
Zhejiang have suffered persecution in the Spring in 2014, but provincial govern-
ments in neighboring provinces did not undertake similar campaigns. Finally, a
constant in all policy changes implemented by the CCP remains in force, at least
in theory:54 aspirant party cadres must profess to be atheists. As many positions
in government need to be filled by CCP members, this means a systematic
discrimination against religious believers in the full participation to public life.
The observations made above of the CCP’s complex and multi-faceted
politicization of religion reveals that the party’s approach to religion is much
more complicated than assumed abroad and cannot be limited to a dogmatic
adoption of atheism as the ‘sole criterion of the truth.’55 In the next section, I
will show how much this complexity results from the evolution of internal
deliberations about how the CCP should relate to religion. These debates, as
well as the existence of a cooperative relationship with some religious actors
and the perception that some religions are a threat to the regime, reveal that far
from adopting a doctrinaire view of religion as irrelevant to Chinese society, the
CCP has a long time ago seen its importance.
52 This was repeatedly reported by colleagues in conferences on religion in China.
53 Tong 2010, 381–384.
54 Party cadres always remind outsiders that it is a requirement, and non-party members scoff
at the idea that a party cadre could have any religious sympathy. However, as the Falungong
affair and numerous case studies of communal religions show, these rigid requirements are
broken at the breach, and all the more so when the practices of communal religions or new
religious movements do not meet the rigid definition of religion the party promotes. For an
example on the latter issue, see Bruun (2003). On the Party cadres’ membership in Falungong
before the crackdown of 1999, see Palmer 2005, and on the participation of cadres to communal
religions’ activities, see Chau 2005b. Falungong was originally a martial arts regime and
became popular when martial arts were being promoted as a great Chinese development.
Anecdotal evidence reported by one anonymous reviewer revealed that party cadres and
officials, if they are believers, are most likely to be Buddhists. But in localities such as
Xiamen, some are even Christians.
55 An oblique reference to Deng Xiaoping’s dictum about “practice as the sole criterion of
truth”, an interpretation of Marx’s materialism Deng made in order to justify his policies.
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3 An un-determined trajectory of ideological
change
The fear over the subversive potential of organized religion, noted above, is
rooted in the historical precedent of religious-political uprisings, and as a result,
the politicization of religion by the CCP shows some remarkable continuity with
past practices by the Chinese state in the imperial and republican eras. In many
respect, what party documents often call the “religious question/issue/problem”
(zongjiao wenti宗教问题), or the role that the sociological category known in the
West as ‘religion’ should play in Chinese society, was debated among intellec-
tuals since the end of the Qing dynasty.56 Hostile actions by the state for the
sake of social stability, such as the suppression of “evil cults” considered a
threat to social stability, the expulsion of Christians missionaries because of
their subversive teachings, the persecution against Buddhism because of its
influence on politics,57 predates by centuries, and more than a millennia in
the case of the latter, the actions of the CCP against some religions.58 These
continuities are striking but we need to keep in mind one crucial difference:
when the imperial state sought to suppress religious deviancy or regulate
religion, it did that in the name of preserving the governance structure of what
John Lagerwey called a “religious state”, in which political and religious author-
ity were not distinct from each other.59
The politicization of religion under Xi Jinping, in its regulatory dimension,
continues this approach, albeit CCP intellectuals, and others, would no doubt
reject the idea that China today is a religious state. In the CCP’s ideology,
“scientific atheism” that represents the intellectual foundation of its view on
religion stands above, and beyond, religious truth, in the same way that the
CCP, as a “vanguard organization”, stands above, and beyond, the law. The CCP
sees in its atheist position the confluence of three different trends. The most
important is the adherence to “scientific Marxism”, as a philosophical system, a
mode of existence, and a principle of social organization. The two other ones
come from different philosophical traditions: the enlightenment tradition of
56 Goossaert/Palmer 2011.
57 The first two persecutions occurred during the Northern Zhou Dynasty, in 574 and 577, the
third one in 845 during the Tang Dynasty, and the last one in 955 during the Late Zhou Dynasty.
Buddhism survived these persecutions as a tolerated religion but never regained the pre-
eminence it had acquired under the Tang before the persecution during the reign of emperor
Wuzong (840–846).
58 For an example of state persecution against a sect, see Kuhn 1990.
59 Lagerwey 2010; Goossaert 2006. Yang 2011 prefers to write about a “substitute religion”.
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Western philosophy, as well as China’s own tradition of atheism, as embodied
by Mencius (Mengzi 孟子) and Guanzi 管子.60 The CCP can count on some
support outside the party to promote that view. Hence, the Society for the
study of atheism (Zhongguo wushenlun xuehui 中国无神论学会), which claims
to represent atheists in China, has founded in 1999 a journal, Science and
Atheism (Kexue wushenlun 科学无神论), that is exclusively dedicated to the
critique of religion from the perspective of philosophy, and targets in particular
“evil cults” and “feudal superstition” (fengjian mixin 封建迷信).61
In marked contrast to European governments adopting a posture of official
secularism in their institutions through constitutional provisions enshrining
freedom of conscience and granting legal recognition without paying attention
to religious doctrine, the CCP shows a lot of interest for religion, which stems
from many sources. The CCP views on religion rest, naturally, on the specific
worldviews adopted by the CCP early on, premised on the materialist perspective
of Karl Marx about the withering away of religion, as well as the views of Lenin
about the means which the state should use to hasten this fate. However, the
situation of China differs in many respects from that of Russia and the European
countries where the state faced one or two major religious organizations. As
seen above, since the 9th century, China has no single religious institution
whose influence and material resources could match those of the state, but
rather a centuries-old tradition in which political and religious authority resided
at the apex of the state. As research on the resilience of popular beliefs shows,
the CCP has failed totally to eradicate the world-view that gods and ancestors
can shape this world.62 As a result, its view on religion also takes into account
the latter’s revolutionary potential, as evidenced in the past history of uprisings
in China inspired by leaders who claimed inspiration from Taoism, Buddhism, or
Christianity, and whose religious dissidence was understood by rulers as poli-
tical dissidence as well.
As a consequence, transplanting to China the institutions inspired by the
Marxist-Leninist views on religion without taking into consideration Chinese
conditions was bound to face difficulties. Social scientists advising the govern-
ment on religious affairs gave up on the theory of “religion as the opiate (of the
masses)” (zongjiao yapianlun 宗教鸦片论) at the beginning of the “reform and
60 See Xi 2012: 2–10.
61 This timing coincides with the investigation of Falungong and the beginning of the cam-
paign targeting the organization and its followers, which casts doubt on the independent nature
of the association.
62 See Chau 2005a; Bruun 2003.
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opening” policy in 1978.63 A more nuanced understanding of religion could be
discussed and serve to orient policies in religious affairs, including the perspec-
tive on the “five characteristics” (wuxing 五性) of religion, which had been
defended by Li Weihan 李维汉, former director of the Party Central Party
School in the 1930s, and which have re-emerged as the basis of the CCP thinking
on religious affairs.64 The “five characteristics” of religion are specific to China
and this justifies, in the eyes of its cadres, why the CCP religious work cannot be
a mechanistic transplant of the USSR policy. For the proponents of this
approach, religion is: long-term (changqi长期), collective (qunzong群众), ethnic
(minzu 民族), international (guoji 国际) and complex (fuza 复杂).65 Because
religion is a long-term phenomenon, the party must work to ensure its compat-
ibility with socialism. The collective nature of religion suggests that this is not
only a matter of individual belief, but also a social reality that requires political
and legal management. The ethnic dimension of religion calls for the party to
respect the religious beliefs of ethnic minorities if it wants to succeed in its
policy of maintaining national unity. Because religions are international, the
party must be vigilant to ensure that they uphold the principles of indepen-
dence, autonomy, and self-governance. Finally, because religion has a complex
nature, the party’s UFWD must improve its understanding of religious
diversity.66
A number of theoretical approaches on religious affairs have emerged over
the years, to provide guidance for more specific aspects of religious works. For
example, the theory of “religion as culture” (zongjiao wenhua lun 宗教文化论)
which emerged in the 1980s, serves as a justification to legitimate the CCP claim
to preserve China’s traditional culture, without appearing to endorse religion as
a rival ideological system.67 Overall, however, the prevailing view of the “five
characteristics” remains the dominant approach guiding party work. This basis
for the CCP religious work, as seen above in reference to the CCP policies
towards different forms of religiosities, does not imply a uniform framework
for the legal supervision of religion. Moreover, as we will see below, it has not
precluded the promulgation of different strategies. The same could be said of the
party documents that serve to guide policies and laws. The oldest directives
63 Duan 2008.
64 Duan 2013: 91–93.
65 Ren 2002.
66 Ren 2002.
67 We can interpret the founding of the Religious Culture Publishing House in 1995 by the
SARA as an official endorsement of the “religion as culture” approach. But we can also see it as
indicative of the length of the protracted nature of the debate about the place of religion in
contemporary Chinese society.
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since the beginning of the reform and opening policies remain in force, even
though more recent legislations add clarifications and details on implementation.68
The CCP issued in 1982 Document 19 for party members.69 Titled “The Basic
Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during our Country’s Socialist
Period”, this statement officially endorsed the break from the party’s repudiation
of religion enforced during the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath. That
document signaled recognition of the importance of religion in Chinese society,
and admitted the mistakes of the previous decade and a half. The party issued
this document at the beginning of the relatively liberal decade during which,
under the leadership of General-Secretaries Hu Yaobang (1982–1987) and Zhao
Ziyang (1987–1989), the CCP considered political as well as economic reforms.
However, in the same way economic reforms hurt vested interests in the control
of State-Owned Enterprises when the Party envisaged their dismantling, any
idea of too relaxed a control over religious believers was bound to affect the
interests of cadres who made a career in controlling religious affairs. Illustrative
of the difficulties in implementing religious work, the CCP issued in 1985 another
policy document, written for and addressed to party organizations, and distrib-
uted to members, which addressed problems in the implementation of the
previous directives.70
Moreover, even though Document 19 repudiated the excesses of the Cultural
Revolution, it did not reflect new thinking in favour of a secular state where
political and religious authorities are separated from each other. Rather, it repre-
sented a compromise between the reformist approach embraced by those who
supported Hu and Zhao in the direction of gradual political reform, and those who
wanted to restore the stability of the authoritarian corporatist mechanism of
control put in place in the few years between 1949 and 1966. The different aspects
of Document 19 expressed these contradictions within the party. Although some of
the paragraphs of Document 19 described freedom of religion in generous terms,
the obligation of party members to be atheists represented a serious limitation to
the civil and political rights of religious believers because, being barred from
joining the party, their participation in state affairs was limited to the public
positions that do not require party membership.71
After the June 4th massacre, the CCP religious policy did not repudiate
Document 19 but political reform was jettisoned. In the climate of repression
68 Zongjiaoju 宗教局 2012.
69 CCCCP 1982.
70 CCCCP 1985.
71 The Party prohibits members to join religious organizations but personal beliefs are a
different matter.
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that followed the events of 1989, CCP leaders expressed concerns that Chinese
converted to Christianity in increasing numbers, and as a result Li Peng, during
a 1990 work conference on religious affairs, asked cadres to pay attention to the
issue on a daily basis.72
The contradictions between political reformists who had advocated separa-
tion between party and state, and their opponents, were “resolved” in favour of
the latter, with the issuance in 1991 by the CCP and the CCP Central Committee
of a policy document that brought more adjustments to religious work.73 In 1993,
however, Jiang Zemin enunciated his views on the compatibility of religion with
socialism.74 This was an important statement that broke from the classical
Marxist perspective predicting the withering away of religion when productive
forces are fully developed. This new-found appreciation of the relevance of
religion did not mean liberalization, though. In 1994, the State Council, under
CCP instructions, promulgated three sets of regulations, about the religious
activities of foreign residents, religious venues, and the registration for religious
venues. These regulations reminded religious believers that they had to practice
their faith within rigorously defined boundaries.
Jiang’s endorsement of the “compatibility theory” (shiyinglun 适应论) on
religion coincided with other bold changes that he promoted in the party,
such as the principle of admitting business people in the CCP, which the 16th
Party Congress approved formally when it ratified in 2002 the “Theory of the
Three Represents”.75 This sequencing of changes constituted another reversal of
Marxist orthodoxy,76 according to which changes in the superstructure of ideol-
ogy, culture, and religion endorse and legitimate prior changes in the social
relations of production. Jiang’s approach, while putting changes in the super-
structure ahead of changes in society’s material base, was not only following on
the footsteps of Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic approach, but it was also reprodu-
cing the attitude of the state in imperial time, when the monopoly of rites was an
extremely important prerogative of rulers whose proper performance was con-
sidered the basis of social stability. The latter point was made clear in 2000 in a
quite dramatic way when the greatest challenge raised against the regime, from
72 See Li 1990: 195a. I thank an external reviewer for this information.
73 CCCCP and SCPRC 1991.
74 The two other points he stressed were: “correctly handle religious affairs” and “improve the
management of religions in accordance with the law”.
75 The “important thought of the Three represents” (sangedaibiao zhongyao sixiang三个代表重
要思想) stipulates that the CCP should represent “advanced social productive forces, advanced
culture, and the interests of the overwhelming majority of the people”.
76 Mao’s voluntarist approach to socialism was a first reversal of classical Marxism.
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the perspective of Jiang, was not internal strife within the CCP over the admis-
sion of business and entrepreneurs, but a controversy of a religious nature.
In July 2000, the seemingly liberal regulatory regime put in place with
Document 19 and its amendments could not prevent the CCP form enforcing
the worst instance of religious persecution since the Cultural Revolution, with
the clampdown against Falungong and other qigong movements.77 In the
same year, the CCP launched two campaigns aiming to show that it remained
committed to its engagement to respect freedom of religion. On the one hand,
it reiterated that China was implementing the rule of law for registration of
religious institutions. On the other hand, it used the same legalistic language
to justify its campaign against what it had labelled “dangerous cults”. Party
cadres enforced instructions from the central leadership to make clear this
distinction between the legitimate religions recognized by the state and the
others, who were stigmatized as responsible for all ills of society. This dis-
tinction, enforced though the Jiang and Hu Jintao administration, remains in
force under Xi, as discussed above in reference to the crackdown in the spring
of 2014.
In 2001, Ye Xiaowen, then director of the SARA, highlighted the main
theoretical and policy prescriptions that party cadres needed to know about,
in the introduction to an overview of the CCP religious work since 1949.78 The
goal of that publication was to show to the outside world that China takes
seriously religious affairs, and is ready to handle them with legal instruments.
That document presented three constitutional benchmarks (jizhun 基准) on
religion as well as lists of instructions directed at the public, cadres, and
scholars working on religious affairs that are still valid in 2014. The “bench-
marks” refer to three specific points (yaodian 要点) relevant to religion among
the 36 articles of the Constitution: “freedom of religious belief”, the “separation
of politics and religion” (zhengjiao fenli 政教分离), and the “independence of
religion”. Although they appear liberal in their wording, they have major limita-
tions. Freedom of religious belief, as most observers have noted, does not
guarantee the freedom to practice, and forbids proselytizing. Separation
between religion and politics is one-sided: religion should not influence politics,
but political leaders, via the CCP UFWD, the State Council’s SARA, and manda-
tory registration in the “patriotic” religious associations, constitute interference
in religious affairs. Finally, the independence of religion (duli banjiao独立办教),
obviously curtailed by the above-mentioned state interference, in effect means
77 For an exhaustive description of that campaign, see Tong 2009.
78 Ye 2001: 1–8.
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“religious organizations are not subjected to influence from foreign hostile
forces from abroad”.79
The CCP guidance on religious work stresses that the public needs to know
about four principles (sige yuanze 四个原则), which are the three constitutional
provisions just mentioned, in addition to relevant rights and obligations (quanli
yu yiwu 权利与义务),80 along with “four maintenances” (sige weihu 四个维护).
The fourth principle, rights and obligations, serves to remind the public of the
CCP particular interpretation of the three constitutional provisions that the
public must know about – and underlines the rationale behind the limitations
just discussed. The respect for the rights of the public – religious believers and
non-believers as well – is conditional on the observance of the following four
requirements: observance of the laws, patriotism, support of the socialist path,
and approval of CCP leadership. To ensure they enjoy their rights, individuals
and organizations – including religious associations – must also observe four
duties. That is, they must maintain: people’s interest (renmin liyi 人民利益);
respect for the law (falu zunyan 法律尊严); unity among ethnic groups (minzu
tuanjie 民族团结); and national unification (zuguo tongyi 祖国统一). The last
three of these duties are in themselves revealing. The respect for the law, at the
time of publication, reflected the CCP’s growing interest for the concept of “rule
of law”, in anticipation of accession to the WTO; the reference to the unity
among ethnic groups alluded to increasing concerns over the rise in unrest
among minorities; and finally evoking the issue of unification reflects the
importance of Taiwan under Jiang, and alludes to the possibility that religious
leaders and their followers in Taiwan can work for unification with their coun-
terparts in China.
The CCP also instructs its cadres about ten basic points they must uphold. In
addition to their respect for the principles of freedom of religion, the promotion
of religious organizations’ independence – as defined above – the management
(guanli 管理) of the separation between the state and religion, and the imple-
mentation (zhengchu正处) of the “four maintenances”, they must: be mindful of
the importance of religion; implement the united front work; encourage religious
groups’ patriotism; understand the differences and connections between reli-
gious and national minority affairs; and seek to realize the compatibility
between religion and socialism. Finally, they must uphold the merits and
moral value of atheist education. Along with these ten principles, cadres must
keep in mind the three sentences (sanjuhua三句话) that they should relay to the
79 Ye 2001: 6.
80 The four principles were promulgated in 1998 by Jiang, during a tour in Xinjiang, in Ye
2001: 4.
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population in general when they want to communicate the CCP policy on
religion: China is a country with religious freedom, the management of religion
is in accordance with the law, and religion is compatible with socialism, three
sayings known as “talk about policies” (jiang zhengce 讲政策), “focus on man-
agement” (gua guanli 挂管理), “promote adaptation” (zu shiying 足适应).
Finally, cadres are instructed to remind members of the epistemic communities
working on religious affairs that they should uphold the viewpoints on the five
characteristics of religion discussed above.81
Hu Jintao moved forward in the recognition of the importance of religion
when in November 2004, the State Council promulgated new Regulations – in 48
detailed articles – which took effect on 1 March 2005.82 James Tong saw in the
language used by the regulation an end to the managerial approach of the state
towards religion.83 Furthermore, the new regulations’ relative placement of mea-
sures that favour the protection of religious freedom before measures that restrict
it suggested a greater acceptance of religion.84 The regulation also circumscribed
the state scope of intervention to the public dimension of religion, not to indivi-
dual believers’ behaviour, in conformity with international standards.85 The reg-
ulations also removed certification requirement and reduced the number of
activities from religious associations needing state approval.86 The new regula-
tions are included in administrative law (xingzheng fagui行政法规), however, and
therefore they are not considered as authoritative as national laws (falü法律). To
be sure, there was no shortage of external comments to criticise the regulation’s
shortcomings.87 Many noted that the CCP had adopted the international standards
of religious freedoms in this document, but they have not always implemented the
substance of that document in some of its policies.88
During the second mandate of Hu, the CCP, the SARA, and academics met to
discuss further the application of the idea that religion is compatible with
socialism. Having promoted the agenda of “harmonious society”, seen by
many as reminiscent of Confucian values, the CCP UFWD came up in 2006
with the “theory on the positive contribution of religions” (zongjiao jiji zuoyong
lun宗教积极作用论). In 2012, a step further was taken in that direction, with the
81 Ren 2002.
82 The following remarks are based on the detailed analysis on these regulations, in Tong
2005.
83 Tong 2010: 384.
84 Tong 2010: 384.
85 Tong 2010: 385.
86 Tong 2010: 385–386.
87 For a critique of the regulation, see Petersen 2006.
88 Yang 2013.
Politicization of Religion by the CCP 203
joint promulgation by the CCP’s UFWD, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the
SARA, of an opinion (yijian 意见) stating that religious associations can engage
in public interest work.89 Although “opinions” have an even lower status than
regulations or laws, it is interesting to note that they allow for religious institu-
tions a greater scope of activities than was previously the case.
Although the CCP has moved since the beginning of the reform and opening
policy towards an increasing acceptance of religion in general and in particular
recognized its compatibility with Chinese contemporary society, there remains
some important resistance. Because leaders have insisted since 1989 on present-
ing an image of unanimity, it is difficult to account for the extent and nature of
this resistance. As Beja noted in his analysis on the Chinese democracy move-
ment’s failure to prevail in the late 1980s, the CCP has sought since the June 4th
massacre to avoid at all cost giving the appearance of division within its own
ranks, lest his adversaries would take advantage of perceived weakness to
undermine its rule. It is too early to tell whether the ongoing campaign of Xi
Jinping against corruption within the CCP is doing damage to the party’s
pretense of unity. However, if there are divisions within the leadership on
religious matters, the evidence so far is scant. The promotion of a positive
view on religion, which goes as far as suggesting it can thrive under socialism,
co-exist with the opposite view-point that as China modernize, it will wither
away while material and scientific progress prevail.90
Under Xi Jinping, and under the direction of Wang Zuo’an in the SARA,
many issues remain unresolved in the domain of religious affairs. There are even
signs that the politicization of religion is going to give less emphasis on the
cooperative side that was embodied with the idea of the compatibility with
socialism under Hu Jintao, rather highlighting the more coercive dimension of
the politicization, with an accent on the idea of religion as a threat. This is what
recent documents on religious work suggest, where the emphasis is on legaliza-
tion (fazhihua 法治化), not in the sense of a wider application of the rule of law
to respect religious freedom, but rather a more comprehensive management of
the affairs of religion in accordance with the law. The recent publication of a
policy paper on religious work pointed to the following international factors as
challenges to religious work: globalization, religious extremism, and the role
played by the internet. It also included challenging domestic factors such as the
collateral damages of the reform and opening policy like growing inequalities,
poverty, along with moral relativism, and decline in public morality. It is
revealing of a bias towards a coercive politicization of religion that the strategy
89 Zongjiaoju 宗教局 2012: 355.
90 Xi 2012.
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envisaged to ensure these problems do not affect development is more super-
vision from the CCP.91
This suggests that the state prefers to rely even more on the official religious
associations to uphold its policies against cults and foreign interference.92 The
fear of cult is not limited to the qigong movement, but also to movements that
claim to be Christian and that are not recognized as such by the official Church.
The CCP anxiety over alleged connection between religions in China and so-
called “foreign hostile forces” was palpable in the notice from the CCP Central
Committee’s UFWD, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the SARA,
distributed by the General Office of the CCCCP and the General Office of the State
Council, to municipalities, municipalities-level and military regiments, about the
“foreign use of religion to infiltrate institutes of higher education” and the issue
of proselytizing on campus.93 The fear over foreign infiltration under the name
of religion has not abated under the leadership of Xi Jinping: on the 60th
anniversary of the founding of the National Committee of the Three-Self
Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches, Wang Zuo’an, the head of the
SARA, pointedly reiterated that Chinese Christian theology should be compatible
with China’s approach to socialism.94
Yet, within the Chinese epistemic community, there are many voices that
offer more nuanced perspectives on religion in world affairs – and therefore on
its compatibility with a resurgent China – that could offer their insights if leaders
want to develop more cooperative policies. Moreover, different departments and
organs of the state, as well as actors in business, civil society, and the religious
sector itself, have conflicting interests. It is not clear to what extent the CCP has
successfully consolidated its uncontested position as the arbiter of these inter-
ests, and to what extent it has totally succeeded in insulating itself from capture
by some interests in business and/or the military. The extreme nervousness of
Jiang Zemin in 1999 and the swiftness of the campaign against Falungong no
doubt relates to that fear that the CCP could be captured by that organization,
even though in retrospect that fear looks exaggerated even if Falungong was
an important organization, as the range of its membership throughout China
and abroad attests.95 However, the fear that China could be overthrown by a
91 Liu 2013: 16.
92 China Daily 2012.
93 General Office of the CCCCP and General Office of the State Council of the PRC 2011.
94 China Daily 2014.
95 For a detailed description of the growth of Falungong before its suppression, see Palmer
2005.
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nation-wide, unified political-religious movement remains improbable in the
near future because of the huge diversity and complexity of China’s religious
landscape.
4 Conclusions
The politicization of religion by the CCP has become increasingly complex and
in that sense reflective of China’s own religious diversity. The surprising finding
is that despite a theoretical commitment to a Marxist-Leninist theory that is
premised on the withering away of religion, the guidance for state policy
towards religion is inspired by the long institutional memory of the Chinese
state’s traditional control of religion, which has inspired in turn the more
sophisticated idea that religion has five characteristics that should serve as a
guide for policy in the long run. According to that perspective, religion is a
lasting phenomenon, more than merely a matter of individual choice, a compo-
nent of ethnic identity, influenced by international trends, and complex in its
manifestations. This view represents a more realistic understanding of China’s
condition than a dogmatic implementation of Marxism-Leninism doctrine would
produce. The different approaches adopted by the CCP to take these realities into
account have oscillated between cooperative and coercive approaches to the
management of religious affairs. What these changes have revealed, though, is
that the CCP is taking religion more seriously than its official pronouncements
would lead one to believe. This has allowed the CCP to develop policies that are
openly supportive of some religions and cooperative, along with others that are
more coercive.
The cooperative/coercive dichotomy used throughout this essay should not
leave the impression that the CCP faces stark choices in dealing with different
religions. The practice on the ground is more complex. The cooperative and
coercive approaches represent opposite ends of a continuum in which the
middle ground is occupied by negotiations, or even a form of benign indiffer-
ence. To borrow from Robert Weller, writing recently about official policy on
religious affairs in China, sometimes the behaviour of the CCP is “governing with
one eye open and one eye closed”.96 The recent decision to encourage religious
institutions’ organization of activities for the public interest suggests a move
forward with some important implications. Religious associations are offered an
improvement of their status as important partners in different social programs
96 Weller 2014.
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and relief efforts, but in doing so they also become, for many followers, adher-
ents, and/or faithful, complicit to a political regime they disapprove on religious
grounds. It is too early to tell whether this politicization of religion by the state
through collaboration can trigger disaffection and exit to other forms of religi-
osity that are underground or illegal. It is also quite possible that the deepening
of cooperative relationship makes religious institutions and their members more
fully supportive of the regime.
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